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Introduction
The natural resource conﬂict dimension of environmental governance
is usually centred on the social and political aspects of production
systems and has hardly addressed the biophysical features of the nat-
ural resources themselves. Here we aim to address renewable and
non-renewable resource-extraction conﬂicts in Latin America in the con-
text of a changing global social metabolism and increasing demands
for environmental justice (M’Gonigle, 1999; Sneddon, Howarth and
Norgaard, 2006; Gerber, Veuthey and Martínez-Alier, 2009; Martinez-
Alier et al., 2010). “Social metabolism” refers to the manner in which
human societies organize their growing exchanges of energy and mate-
rials with the environment (Fischer-Kowalski, 1997; Martinez-Alier,
2009). In this chapter we use a sociometabolic approach to exam-
ine the material ﬂows (extraction, exports, imports) of Latin American
economies and furthermore look into the socioenvironmental pressures
and conﬂicts that they cause. Sociometabolic trends can be appraised
using different and complementary indicators. For instance, the Human
Appropriation of Net Primary Production (HANPP) measures to what
extent human activities appropriate the biomass available each year
for ecosystems (Haberl et al., 2007). Other examples are indicators that
study virtual water ﬂows, the energy return on investment (EROI) or
a product life cycle. Each indicator provides information on different
aspects of our economic performance.
In this chapter we will address the economy-wide material ﬂow anal-
ysis (MFA) in more detail. The MFA is “a consistent compilation of the
overall material inputs into national economies, the material accumu-
lation within the economic system and the material outputs to other
economies or to the environment” (EUROSTAT, 2001: 17). MFA aims
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to complement the system of national accounting with a compatible
system of biophysical national accounts, using tonnes per year as the
key unit of measurement. Such methodology provides a picture of the
physical dimension of the economy, where the total turnover of energy
and materials of the socioeconomic system can be analysed histori-
cally or cross-sectioned through the accounting of input ﬂows (tonnes
of biomass, fossil fuels, construction minerals, etc.) or output ﬂows
(tonnes of materials exported, waste or pollutant generated). Focusing
on the input side by taking into account all materials that enter into
the national economy allows for an acknowledgment of the physical
dimension of foreign trade and can determine the amount of all out-
puts transferred to the environment (Gonzalez-Martinez and Schandl,
2008). While MFA presents some limitations regarding, for instance, the
qualitative differences between materials (i.e. toxicity, environmental
or social context of extraction), it offers a picture of the overall evo-
lution of the pressures exerted by an economy to extract renewable and
non-renewable resources.
A social metabolic approach acknowledges that inputs into the econ-
omy ultimately become outputs from the economy in the form of waste
(except for the part that accumulates as a stock, as in buildings). The
main output in volume from rich economies (apart from wastewater) is
carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, the excessive produc-
tion of which is a main source of climate change. Solid wastes produced
by the economy are disposed of locally (in landﬁlls or incinerators),
or sometimes exported to distant regions or countries. All goods cir-
culate through “commodity chains” (Raikes, Friis Jensen and Ponte,
2000) – that is, from cradle to grave or from point of extraction to waste
disposal. Ecological distribution conﬂicts occur at different stages as
peasant or tribal groups, national or multinational companies, national
governments, local or international NGOs, and consumer groups are all
stakeholders.
Economic change generally occurs for the beneﬁt of some groups and
at the expense of other existing or future groups (Hornborg, 2009).
Externalities can be positive (like the free environmental services pro-
vided by a forest) or negative. Negative externalities are not seen here
as market failures but rather as (provisional) cost-shifting successes
(Kapp, 1950). Optimistic views regarding ecological modernization, the
“dematerialization” of the economy (Stern, 2004), are confronted with
the reality of increased inputs of energy and materials into the world
economy, thereby increasing the production of waste and ecological
distribution conﬂicts.
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Ecological distribution conﬂicts are struggles over the burdens of pol-
lution or over the sacriﬁces made to extract resources, and they arise
from inequalities of income and power (Martinez-Alier and O’Connor,
1996; Douguet, O’Connor and Noel, 2008). The concept of ecological
distributive conﬂicts is born of the intersection between the ﬁelds of
ecological economics and political ecology, which links the emergence
of environmental conﬂicts in the global South with the growth of the
metabolism of societies in the global North (which includes parts of
China). Political ecology focuses on the exercise of power in environ-
mental conﬂicts. In other words, the question is: Who has the power
to impose decisions on resource extraction, land use, pollution levels,
biodiversity loss, and more importantly, who has the power to deter-
mine the procedures to impose such decisions (Martinez-Alier, 2001,
2002; Robbins, 2004)?
Ecological distribution conﬂicts emerge from the structural asymme-
tries in the burdens of pollution and in the access to natural resources
that are grounded in unequal distributions of power and income, and in
social inequalities of ethnicity, caste, social class and gender (Martínez-
Alier, 1997; Martinez-Alier et al., 2011). As processes of valuation surpass
economic rationality in attempts to assign market prices and chrema-
tistic costs to the environment, social actors mobilize for material and
symbolic interests (of survival, identity, autonomy and quality of life),
beyond strictly economic demands of property, means of production,
employment, income distribution and development (Leff, 2003). Some-
times the local actors claim redistribution, leading to conﬂicts that are
often part of, or lead to, larger struggles of gender, class, caste and
ethnicity (Agarwal, 1994; Robbins, 2004). Hence the concept of “envi-
ronmental justice” is important. It was born in the USA (Bullard, 1990)
and it has gained growing acceptance in extractive industries, water use
and waste-disposal conﬂicts all over the word (Urkidi and Walter, 2011).
Not all conﬂicts are born from immediate metabolic needs. Demand for
certain commodities such as gold arises in part from the search to have
an investment outlet that furthermore allows for speculation. Other
metals, such as copper, can also be stored and used as guarantees for
speculative loans. The fact remains that both energy-carriers (coal, gas,
oil) and metallic minerals are inputs for the industrial economy and that
their use, in total, grows more or less in proportion to the growth of the
economy.
In this chapter, we analyse the material ﬂows of Latin American
countries and their implications in terms of socioenvironmental con-
ﬂict. First, we present an overview of recent material-ﬂow studies
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conducted in this region. Second, we examine in further detail the
socioenvironmental pressures exerted by the extraction of renewable
and non-renewable materials. We propose a classiﬁcation of extractive
conﬂicts based on the commodity at stake. With this double approach
we address the process of growing primarization of Latin American
economies, its trends and some of its drivers, while simultaneously
exploring the local pressures and conﬂicts that this process is foster-
ing. At the macroeconomic level, we point to the paradox that the large
physical exports are unable, or scarcely able, to ﬁnance the imports so
that many countries are falling into commercial deﬁcits.
Latin American sociometabolic trends
Different indicators can be used to analyse Latin American sociometa-
bolic features and trends. Here we consider recent MFA studies con-
ducted on Latin American economies and discuss their implications
in terms of socioenvironmental pressures and injustices. MFAs have
been conducted in most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, but only recently has research been
conducted in the Latin American region and some of its countries in
particular, such as Argentina (Perez-Manrique et al., 2013), Colombia
and Ecuador (Russi et al., 2008; Vallejo, Pérez Rincón and Martinez-Alier,
2011; West and Schandl, 2013; Samaniego, Vallejo and Martinez-Alier,
2014). MFAs conducted on the overall region indicate that there was a
four-fold increase in material ﬂows between 1970 and 2008 for domes-
tic consumption and also for exports. The Latin American economy
has certainly not become “dematerialized” – one could compare such
trends with other geographical regions, such as Europe, where the rate
of increase in material extraction has been much lower, or with India,
which has a lower rate of material extraction per capita than Latin
America and which is not a net exporter in physical terms (Singh
et al., 2012). Such physical indicators are useful for characterizing the
economic structure of countries and regions.
Latin American economies, and particularly South American
economies, have a persistent and increasing physical trade deﬁcit (West
and Schandl, 2013). The physical trade balance (PTB) is the difference
between the number of tonnes of materials that are imported by an
economy and the number of tonnes that are exported. The monetary
trade balance (MTB) is the difference between how much is paid for
the imports and how much is earned by exports in monetary terms.
Exports in tonnes are larger than imports in tonnes, resulting in a
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Figure 2.1 Latin America physical trade deﬁcit in million tonnes, 1970–2008
Source: UNEP and CSIRO, 2013.
“deﬁcit” in the same sense that would be applied to a tree plantation
that grows less than the harvest rate. Figure 2.1 presents a yearly PTB of
the Latin America region (including Mexico) per type of material from
1970 and 2008. Note in Figure 2.1 the increased physical trade deﬁcit
for metal ores and industrial minerals, which reﬂects the growing pres-
sure to extract and export these materials. While one tonne of uranium
is, of course, environmentally very different from one tonne of sand
and gravel, or one tonne of cellulose from one tonne of shrimp, our
aim here is to show trends within broad material categories, where the
shift in the composition by commodities is not that important. Later we
take a closer look at the different commodities within the categories of
biomass and metal ores.
There are internal and external pressures to increase the extraction
of materials, for domestic use and for export. Such increasing pressures
to extract materials displace the commodity frontiers (Moore, 2000) to
new territories often inhabited by peasant and indigenous groups, who
complain accordingly as we signal in further detail in the next section
(Conde and Walter, 2014). In regard to external trade, trends point
to a structural persistence of an “ecologically unequal exchange”. This
concept challenges the argument that exports from developing nations
foster economic growth and development, and points to the physical
and socioenvironmental trade-offs at play (Hornborg, 1998; Muradian
and Martinez-Alier, 2001; Bunker, 2007). Studies in this ﬁeld highlight
how poor countries are exporting goods at prices that do not take into
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account local externalities or depletion of natural resources, in exchange
for the purchase of expensive goods and services from richer regions.
One can measure ecologically unequal trade in terms of the inequality of
various dimensions, such as hours of labour, hectares of land, tonnes of
materials, water footprints, and joules or calories. When all or most indi-
cators point in a similar direction, then we can state that there has been
an unequal exchange (Hornborg, 2006). Ecologically unequal exchange
arises from the structural fact that the metropolitan regions or countries
require increasing amounts of energy and materials at cheap prices for
their metabolism.
The terms of trade are persistently negative for South America as a
whole and for most countries individually (one tonne of imports is
always more expensive than one tonne of exports, from two to ﬁve
times) in the very long term. However, the terms of trade improved
somewhat in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, fuelling a wave
of optimism regarding economic growth but later deteriorating again
(Samaniego, Vallejo and Martinez-Alier, 2014). Currently, the large phys-
ical exports can scarcely pay for the imports in most South American
countries. A large physical trade deﬁcit does not imply a positive MTB,
and, on the contrary, recent LA trends point to simultaneous physi-
cal and monetary deﬁcits. Either in 2013 or 2014, or in both years,
there were commercial deﬁcits in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
other countries. While Argentina’s commercial surplus has been much
reduced, there is now a need to ﬁnance commercial deﬁcits (Samaniego,
Vallejo and Martinez-Alier, 2014). For Argentina, our analysis of the
external trade over a long period (1970–2009) shows (Figure 2.2) small
monetary surpluses since the end of the 1990s (in 2001–2002 the sur-
plus increased because the economic crisis violently reduced imports).
Such small monetary surpluses almost disappeared in 2013–2014. From
a physical point of view, Argentina has exported increasing amounts
(in tonnes) since the early 1990s (between three and four times its
imports in tonnes), thus demonstrating structurally negative terms of
trade.
We do not enter into a detailed study here of the physical structure
of external trade in the sense of looking at its biomass, mineral and
fossil-fuel components (Perez-Manrique et al., 2013; West and Schandl,
2013). We point out, however, that Argentina exports – like Brazil –
large amounts of biomass. In comparison, another large South American
country, Colombia, does not export large amounts of biomass products
but it does export large amounts of coal. The PTB of Colombia shows
long-term trends that are not very different from those of Argentina,
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Figure 2.2 Argentina’s physical and monetary external trade ﬂows, 1970–2009
Source: Walter et al. (2013).
namely, physical exports exceed physical imports by a factor of no
less than three (Figure 2.3). It must be noted that Colombia’s large
physical exports (which entail large unpaid socioenvironmental liabil-
ities) are now unable to pay for the imports. As Figure 2.3 shows, in
2011, Colombia exported about 120 million tonnes and imported about
30 million tonnes, leaving a physical trade deﬁcit of more than 90 mil-
lion tonnes. This is for a country of more than 45 million inhabitants.
Argentina, with a population of about 40 million, has reached exports
of about 100 million tonnes and imports of about 30 million tonnes
(Perez-Manrique et al., 2013). Similar trends, with slight differences, are
identiﬁed in Brazil, Ecuador and Peru. Growing exports in tonnes (of dif-
ferent commodities) are not succeeding in improving the MTBs due to
the negative terms of trade (Vallejo, Pérez Rincón and Martinez-Alier,
2011; Pérez-Rincón, 2014; Samaniego, Vallejo and Martinez-Alier, 2014).
To conclude this section, the critiques against extractivism have a
double economic foundation. Domestic extraction and exports increase
as they are driven by internal and external demand. Raw materials-
based economies incur disproportionate environmental costs, which
are not factored into the price of commodities (Rice, 2007; Jorgenson,
2009; Roberts and Parks, 2009). Moreover, exhaustion of resources is
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Figure 2.3 Physical trade balance of Colombia, 1990–2011
Source: Samaniego et al. (2014) based on COMTRADE, DANE.
renamed as “production” and it sustains periodic periods of bonanza.
Outside demand does increase because of the metabolic needs of the
world industrial economy. The recent growth of Asian economies, and
China in particular, is exacerbating the primarization of Latin American
economies by boosting the pressure to extract environmentally sensi-
tive resources (Muradian, Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2012). Recently,
an absurd situation has been reached: not only are the environmental
costs of the booming extractive activities not accounted for, and the
exhausted resources not replenished, but, moreover, the great excess
of physical exports over imports is not able to pay for the imports.
The commercial deﬁcits will have to be compensated for by foreign
investments or other forms of debt, which in due course will produce
repayments to foreign countries. These are becoming key drivers that
strengthen extraction trends, thereby expanding the commodity fron-
tiers and reaching areas of high biodiversity and cultural value – the land
of indigenous and peasant communities.
Extractive conﬂicts in Latin America
As pointed out in the previous section, there is an ongoing boom in
the extraction of commodities in Latin America, and a large share of
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these materials is exported. This boom has been related to an increase
in the number of extractive conﬂicts, which we frame as “ecological
distribution conﬂicts”. In order to elucidate the connections between
sociometabolic trends and extractive conﬂicts, we propose a typology
based on the commodity at stake. For each commodity type we will
brieﬂy explain some key features and illustrate with examples. Each
commodity has its particularities and, as a result, different typologies
could be proposed. We don’t claim that the one used here is the best
or the only possible one, but we use it as a guiding tool to distinguish
key trends and features. We propose a classiﬁcation that distinguishes
between biomass (crops, plantations, ﬁsheries) and minerals (metal ores,
fuels, industrial, construction materials).
Within this typology, other subclassiﬁcations could be considered. For
instance, from a social metabolism point of view, another distinction
can be made between precious materials and bulk commodities when
considering metallic minerals or biomass products (Wallerstein, 1974).
Precious materials, such as diamonds, gold or shrimp, have a high eco-
nomic value per unit of weight but are physically not necessary as inputs
for the metabolism of the importing countries, compared with “bulk
commodities”, such as oil, gas, copper, iron, wood or soyabeans. This
distinction does not mean that gold does not play an important social
and economic role in the world of jewellery-making, in the world of love
and marriage (as in India) or in the world of ﬁnancial investments (Ali,
2006), but the difference stands in the point of view of the metabolism
of the importing economies. Moreover, this difference is also related
to different drivers for extraction and the related socioenvironmental
pressure exerted.
Biomass
Extractive conﬂicts related to biomass involve a range of activities,
including soy, oil palm and timber production, plantations, ﬁsheries,
and mangrove destruction and other deforestation. We could also
include related conﬂicts such as those over the use of glyphosate (for the
production of genetically modiﬁed organisms, such as soy) and over the
implementation of projects for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD).
Let us consider here the case of Argentina (Perez-Manrique et al.,
2013). As shown in Figure 2.4, biomass is the predominant mate-
rial ﬂow of this economy. On average, biomass represents 70% of all
materials extracted in the country from 1970 to 2009, of which 71%
comprise fodder for livestock (forage, silage, grazing and by-products),
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Figure 2.4 Domestic extraction in Argentina, 1970–2009
Source: Walter et al. (2013).
2% ﬁshing and forestry biomass, and 27% crops. From 1997 to 2009,
biomass extraction from primary crops increased from 50 megatonnes
(Mt (1 million tonnes)) to 137 Mt, mainly for export. Soyabeans con-
stitute the predominant ﬂow within the primary crops. According to
Pengue (2001), soyabeans (mostly genetically modiﬁed) have displaced
other domestically produced crops such as cereals, roots, tubers, vegeta-
bles and melons. Indeed, during the period studied, these crops have
decreased their participation in the primary crop extraction from 44%
to 25% for cereals, from 6% to 2% for roots and tubers, and from 5%
to 2% for vegetables and melons. From 1970 to 2009, Argentina’s soy-
abean production jumped from 26,000 tonnes to 30.9 Mt. This growth
was driven by high international prices for this commodity from the
1990s onwards, and by technological factors such as the mechaniza-
tion of agriculture, and the introduction of transgenic soyabeans and
chemical weeding with glyphosate (Teubal, 2006). Since the introduc-
tion of genetically modiﬁed soyabeans in Argentina in 1996, this crop
represents an average of 26% of all primary crops.
The rise in crop production led to the expansion of the agricultural
frontier, thereby clearing land and forest as well as displacing indigenous
and rural communities. Since the 1990s, Argentina has been experienc-
ing one of the largest processes of deforestation in the history of the
country (UMSEF, 2007). This entails new issues, such as the weakening
of food security, as crops are mainly exported and the production of
locally consumed crops is decreasing. The growing use of agrochemicals
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produces water, air and soil pollution, and causes health impacts on
the surrounding populations (Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso, 2009).
The harvested area of soyabeans multiplied from 38,000 hectares (Ha)
in 1970 to 18 million Ha in 2009, accounting for more than half of
the total agricultural land (MAGyP, 2011). The predominant biomass
ﬂow in the economy of Argentina is still grazing, foraging, silage and
by-products. Nevertheless, the expansion of soyabean crops diminished
the amount of land available for cattle-grazing. Millions of hectares
that were in agricultural-cattle rotation have been allocated to perma-
nent agriculture, while livestock increasingly depends on feed crops (i.e.
cereal, soymeal) (Santarcángelo and Fal, 2009; PEA, 2010).
These trends have contributed to an increased number of conﬂicts
over land in Argentina, as peasants and indigenous groups are con-
fronted with the expansion of the soy-extraction frontier into their
lands (Aranda, 2010). The expansion of the agricultural frontier has led
to the clearing of lands and forest, as well as the displacement of many
indigenous and rural populations (Teubal, 2006). This has resulted in
various conﬂicts over access to land. This is the case for the inhabitants
of La Primavera (Formosa, Argentina), who have been displaced by the
expansion of soy production ever since 2008. Indigenous communities
have been dispossessed of their lands, and the Qom people are struggling
to recover 5,000 Ha (Asociación Civil Nodo Tau, 2010; García-López and
Arizpe, 2010).
The increased use of chemicals in genetically modiﬁed (GM) crops
has also triggered an increasing number of conﬂicts related to the health
impacts. This is the case for the “mothers of Ituzaingó” of Cordoba, who
lead a movement that is mainly composed of women who since 2001
have been demanding that the provincial government stop the air fumi-
gation of soy ﬁelds. The spraying of large amounts of glyphosate near
urban areas was causing cases of cancer (mostly in children) and birth
defects induced by contamination. In 2009 the movement succeeded in
forbidding the spraying of this product in urban areas (GRR, 2009). Inci-
dentally, some invasive species such as Aleppo sorghum (or Johnsson
grass) acquired resistance to glyphosate spraying, and as a result agricul-
ture steps not only into a pesticide treadmill but also into a “transgenic
treadmill” (Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso, 2009).
Tree plantations have similarly been the subject of socioenvironmental
conﬂicts. As analysed by Gerber (2011), industrial tree plantations for
wood, palm oil and rubber production are among the fastest-growing
monocultures and are currently being promoted as carbon sinks and
energy producers. Such plantations are causing a large number of
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conﬂicts between companies and local populations, mostly in the trop-
ics and subtropics. Relying on the most comprehensive literature review
to date, corresponding to 58 worldwide conﬂict cases (drawing on
the WRM database), Gerber (2011) ﬁnds that the prominent cause of
resistance is related to corporate control over land that results in dis-
placements and the end of local uses of ecosystems as they are replaced
by monocultures.
Biomass conﬂicts related to ﬁsheries and shrimp aquaculture are also
relevant in Latin America. Let us brieﬂy consider here the environmental
injustices related to the promotion of the shrimp aquaculture indus-
try in Central America, in the Gulf of Fonseca region of Nicaragua and
Honduras on the Paciﬁc Coast. This is one of the most densely popu-
lated areas in Central America and also one of the poorest. This regional
economy depends, to a large extent, on artisanal ﬁshing, speciﬁcally
shellﬁsh harvesting. Industrial aquaculture activities began in Honduras
at the start of the 1970s and in Nicaragua in the second half of the
1980s with small-scale projects. Nowadays this activity has sharply
increased. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations, in 2008 production had reached 26,584 tonnes, and
14,690 tonnes in Honduras and Nicaragua, respectively. This implies an
increase in total production of more than 200% in both countries over
ten years (1998–2008). Most of the production is for export, mainly
to the USA and to European markets. Where there were once estuar-
ies and natural lagoons, nowadays there are large ponds for producing
shrimp. In Nicaragua the surface area under production expanded from
771 Ha in 1989 to 10,396 Ha in 2009, and in Honduras from 750 Ha in
1985 to 14,954 Ha in 2000 (Mestre Montserrat and Ortega Cerdà, 2012).
What was supposed to become a source of wealth for the regional
economy has disempowered local ﬁshing communities, which have
seen their access to natural resources enclosed and limited. This has
triggered serious social conﬂicts in the region. The industrial sites
are located in areas populated by poor communities that rely on the
communal use of coastal resources. The main response of the shrimp
industry to the theft of their product has been the armed surveillance of
their lands, both private and public. This has been a common practice
in Nicaragua since 2008, when an agreement was established between
the Association of Aquaculturalists of Nicaragua and the armed forces.
These measures have further limited the access of local communities to
coastal resources, fostering conﬂict and further impoverishing the pop-
ulation, thereby increasing social marginalization and unrest. As Mestre
Montserrat and Ortega Cerdà (2012) indicate, successive conﬂicts
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between security forces protecting aquaculture farms and local ﬁsher-
men have caused various injuries and at least one death in Nicaragua,
and twelve deaths in Honduras. Fishermen have reported cases in which
navigation to their ﬁshing grounds through the estuarine channels has
been restricted, along with cases of detention and harassment – in the
form of constant demands for documentation to be shown – at sea. In
Honduras, people engaged in campaigns to resist the expansion of the
shrimp industry into protected areas have also been detained.
In Latin America, as elsewhere, the views of social groups involved
in such conﬂicts over biomass are expressed in different “languages”,
using, for example, discourses about land and territorial dispossession,
territorial rights, biopiracy, consultation rights, health impacts (due to
chemical use), food sovereignty, human rights (given criminalization
and militarization of extractive activities) and democracy. Unsustainable
biomass extraction is also linked with conﬂicts over the rights of nature
and of future generations, as biodiversity and nature’s genetic pool are
affected (by reducing the diversity of crops or advancing towards high-
diversity areas). Potential future conﬂicts could also arise as intensive
agricultural practices affect the long-term quality of soils (Pengue, 2001,
2004; Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso, 2009).
Minerals
Mineral mining includes a range of commodities that can be grouped as
metals (e.g. copper, gold, silver, iron, bauxite, uranium, nickel), mineral
fuels (e.g. oil, gas, coal, shale oil), industrial minerals (e.g. phosphates,
asbestos, salt) and construction minerals (e.g. sand, gravel, stones). The
general stages of the mining process are shared: exploration to locate
and characterize the mineral deposits, exploitation to mine the ores,
mineral processing to reﬁne the mineral, and transport to the consum-
ing economies. However, the features and impacts of each commodity
vary. Here we present some key features of the different minerals, and
analyse in more detail metal and fuel minerals whose extraction is
currently triggering signiﬁcant debates in Latin America.
Metal ores
The extraction boom of raw materials in Latin American has been par-
ticularly signiﬁcant for metal ores (see Figure 2.5). While in 1970 the
weight of industrial and metal ores accounted for 10% of the total
material ﬂows of Latin America, in 2009 it reached 25%. In fact, in
2009, industrial and metals ores were, after biomass, the second greatest
material extracted and, in part, exported from the region, accounting
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Figure 2.5 Domestic extraction in Latin America by major category of material,
1970–2008
Source: UNEP and CSIRO (2013).
for 2,100 million tonnes of ores (West and Schandl, 2013). In 2012,
Latin America provided 45% of the global copper output, as well as
50% of silver, 26% of molybdenum, 21% of zinc and 20% of gold
(Henriquez, 2012), attracting a third of global metal-mining investments
(US$210 billion) (Ericsson and Larsson, 2013). We will address with
some detail metal ore extraction features and trends that are currently
related to a boom of conﬂicts in Latin America.
One of the particularities of the metal-mining production chain is that
its initial stages are characterized by low value but high environmental
cost: resource extraction and then processing/reﬁning have the highest
impact. Later stages, such as assembling, are estimated to have less envi-
ronmental impact but generate the majority of the economic value. This
relationship represents a general trend of the impact/value curve that
also applies more generally to other products that use metal ores (Giurco
et al., 2010). Moreover, the socioenvironmental impacts of resource
extraction increase when ore grades decline, as more waste is gener-
ated. As pressure to extract ores increases and the extraction frontier
expands, reaching lower quality deposits, the environmental pressures
in the stages of extraction and processing become greater (Giurco et al.,
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Table 2.1 General conversion factors of gross ore versus metal content and ore
concentrate











Source: Based on Schoer et al. (2012).
2010). Table 2.1 presents general conversion factors for the relationship
between metal ores or concentrates and the gross ore that is mined. This
factor is derived from the average of the annual business reports of about
160 metal mines in the world (Schoer et al., 2012).
Precious materials, such as gold, have the highest generation of over-
burden. As indicated in Table 2.1, to obtain 2 grams of gold, an average
of 1 tonne of gross ore has to be mined. As the price per unit of pre-
cious metals is higher than for bulk metals, it becomes economically
feasible to extract ore of decreasing quality or grade, entailing the pro-
cessing of larger amounts of ore in open-cast mining and, as a result,
generating increasing amounts of waste rock and tailings. This has also
been made possible with the development of (more intensive) process-
ing techniques that allow miners to obtain metals from decreasing ore
concentrations (i.e. cyanide leaching for gold) (Bridge, 2004).
Moreover, other studies point to a worldwide decline in the quality
of ore.1 As the high-grade ores have been depleted, the mining fron-
tier moves to lower-grade ores, with increasing environmental costs.
The decline in the quality of ores has direct implications in terms of
land intervention of mining activities, as larger mines (open-pit min-
ing) have to be built and larger quantities of waste rock – especially
sensitive in the case of sulphidic material that has the potential to gen-
erate acid drainages2 – are generated (Bridge, 2004; Giurco et al., 2010;
Mudd, 2010). For instance, recent studies conducted in the gold-mining
sector in Australia indicate that, as ore quality decreases, the amount
of water and energy used in the mining process increases signiﬁcantly.
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This trend overlaps with other environmental pressures, such as larger
requirements of chemical inputs and larger amounts of waste (Mudd,
2007a, 2007b; Giurco et al., 2010; Prior et al., 2012).
The signiﬁcance of these trends grows as we consider the expansion of
the mining frontier to sensitive and critical ecosystems, such as tropical
and cloud forests, or the very high mountains next to pasturelands and
glaciers. These are also the homes of indigenous people. As pointed out
by Bridge (2004), an increasing proportion of mineral exploration and
investment expenditures during the 1990s targeted the tropical areas
around the globe, reaching ecologically sensitive and/or high-value con-
servation areas. The International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) has raised concerns related to the expansion of the mining, gas
and oil frontier in World Heritage Sites, demanding protection for them
(IUCN, 2011). Furthermore, recent studies led by scholars and activists
are pointing to the large overlap of mining concessions with the land of
peasants and indigenous people in Latin America (Bebbington, 2012b).
For instance, de Echave (2009, quoted in Bebbington, 2012b) estimates
that over half of Peruvian peasant communities are affected by mining
projects or concessions. According to the EJOLT database (see below),
in Latin America, indigenous peoples are present in over 50% of the
environmental conﬂicts recorded to date in this registry (Pérez-Rincón,
2014). Chapter 11 on community consultations analyses in more detail
some aspects of metal-mining conﬂicts in Latin America.
Moreover, it is important to stress that in the case of mining activities,
ecoefﬁciency and technological approaches are limited. As the environ-
mental impacts of mineral extraction can be reduced but not eliminated
(Bridge, 2004), inputs to the mining process – such as water, energy
or chemical compounds – can be reduced (per unit of production), the
management of waste can be improved (e.g. better membranes to isolate
waste from soil), and mining sites can be rehabilitated (e.g. revegeta-
tion). However, mineral mining necessarily modiﬁes the environment
to some degree. Moreover, operationalizing ecoefﬁciency in the mining
sector is complicated by the fact that mining (unlike other industrial
processes) is a segregative process that cannot avoid the production of
large volumes of waste. This is increasingly signiﬁcant considering the
wider trends of declining ore qualities. Along the same vein, Giurco et al.
(2010) maintain that mineral resource depletion is as much about falling
resource quality (decreasing ores) and accessibility (distant and difﬁcult
to extract, with higher social and environmental costs and related con-
ﬂicts) as it is about a reduction in resource quantity and availability.
As follows, Prior and colleagues (2012) suggest that the “peak metal”
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(the time when extraction can no longer rise to meet the demand)
has more to do with a carefully weighed decision that considers the
social and environmental implications of continuing to extract than a
question of existing metal quantities available.
In early 2014, OCMAL, a network of organizations that records large-
scale metal-mining conﬂicts, listed 203 active conﬂicts affecting 308
communities. According to OCMAL (2014), the largest number of min-
ing conﬂicts are found in Peru (35), Chile (35), Argentina (26), Mexico
(32), Brazil (20), Colombia (12), Bolivia (9) and Ecuador (7). Central
America as a whole also has many mining conﬂicts. The impact of
large-scale metal-mining activities on water, land, health, livelihoods
and rights raises concerns among communities that feel disempow-
ered by ofﬁcial decision-making procedures that place a premium on
ecoefﬁciency and pecuniary criteria. Governments and mining compa-
nies frame complaints as being politically motivated and misinformed
(Walter, 2014), but such a widespread wave of complaints (and so much
violence against the protestors, at least in some countries) is evidence of
a vigorous grassroots social movement.
Mineral fuels
This category includes a diversity of commodities, such as oil, natu-
ral gas and shale-gas fracking. We could also consider energy-related
conﬂicts related to thermoelectricity plants. Oil is the main source
of energy of modern societies; it is an essential input for the exoso-
matic energy metabolism of contemporary rich economies (transport,
industry, etc.). The growth of the world economy has relied on fossil
fuels over the last century, and the oil demand and consumption have
increased steadily throughout the twentieth century. However, since the
1960s, there has been a decrease in the number of new discoveries of
conventional oil reservoirs. Moreover, recent discoveries reveal decreas-
ing quality, thus implying larger economic and environmental costs
(Tsoskounoglou, Ayerides and Tritopoulou, 2008). As the pressure to ﬁnd
and extract conventional and unconventional fossil fuels augments, the
frontiers of exploration and extraction expand, reaching environmental
and socially sensitive locations.
One area in Latin America where the expansion of the oil-mining
frontier has strongly impacted one of the culturally and biologically
most diverse regions on Earth is in the Peruvian Amazon. Orta-Martínez
and Finer (2010) indicate that since the 1920s, oil exploration and
extraction in this region have threatened both biodiversity and indige-
nous peoples, particularly those living in voluntary isolation. They argue
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that the phenomenon of peak oil, combined with rising demand and
consumption, is pushing oil extraction into the most remote corners
of the world. As modern patterns of production and consumption, and
high oil prices, are forcing a new oil exploratory boom in the Peruvian
Amazon, conﬂicts are spreading across indigenous territories, new forms
of resistance appear, and indigenous political organizations are born.
The expanding oil and gas frontiers are overlapping with the lands of
indigenous peoples, some of whom were previously uncontacted, which
fosters conﬂict, disease and unrest among these communities (Finer and
Orta-Martínez, 2010; Orta-Martínez and Finer, 2010; Gavaldà, 2013).
An important case of struggle over the environmental injustices of oil
extraction is in Lago Agrio, in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Between 1964
and 1992, Texaco’s oil operations polluted the northern region of the
Amazon forest in Ecuador, spanning 1 million Ha inhabited by vari-
ous indigenous communities and resulting in environmental and health
damage. Texaco was bought by Chevron in 2001. In 1993, local residents
and indigenous communities ﬁled a class-action lawsuit against Texaco
in the District Court in New York for damages caused to their health and
to the environment. For ten years the case was stalled in the US Courts,
until 2003, when eventually the trial was moved to the Ecuadorian
Amazon town of Lago Agrio. In 2011, in a landmark judgement, the
local Sucumbios court sentenced Chevron Texaco to pay US$9.5 billion
to the Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia, which would be doubled if the
company did not publicly apologize. The court decision was upheld in
2012. Chevron has refused to pay and activists have tried to seize the
company assets in third-party countries, such as Canada and Argentina.
Industrial and construction minerals
Industrial minerals include those used in industrial and agricultural
processes. These minerals have different levels of toxicity and the pres-
sures to extract them depend on their industrial uses. There are, for
instance, conﬂicts related to the asbestos-mining in different places in
Latin America. An example is the conﬂict of Sao Felix do Amianto in the
state of Bahia (Brazil), which was open between 1939 and 1967 in the
towns of Bom Jesus da Serra and Poçoes. There are many claims asking
for compensation for health impacts, from workers both in the mine
and in the factory.
There are also conﬂicts related to industrial minerals that are less
toxic, such as phosphates. For instance, the Bayovar mine that is located
in the north of Peru and is owned by Vale produces 5 million tonnes of
phosphates per year (EJOLT, 2014).
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Construction minerals are materials such as sand and gravel that are
related to urbanization processes and infrastructure construction. These
materials travel less than other materials because of their relatively low
price per unit of weight, and for this reason they tend to be near the
sites of processing and ﬁnal use. As follows, conﬂicts over quarries are
usually related to conﬂicts over processing plants (e.g. cement factories).
An example of conﬂicts related to sand and gravel extraction is in Rio
Tunjuelo (Bogotá, Colombia), one of the main sources of construction
minerals in Bogotá. Some 50 years of extraction of sands and gravels
have changed the urban landscape, shaping large holes in the ground.
These holes are 30, 50 or 70 m deep and have diameters that reach sev-
eral hundreds of metres. In 2002, in order to avoid the impact of a
serious ﬂood, old mining holes were used as water reservoirs to divert
overﬂowing water from the Tunjuelo River. Flooded quarries became
a source of infections and bad odours, as abandoned quarries became
water oxidation ponds. Social unrest was born from the impact of aban-
doned quarries on water, and the environmental impacts related to the
nearby processing plants. Another example is the conﬂict in San Juan
Sacatepequez in Guatemala, where indigenous communities fostered a
local consultation to stop the opening of a quarry and its processing
plant on their lands. These activities were promoted by the national
government without the consent of local inhabitants (EJOLT, 2014).
Conﬂicts at different points in the commodity chain
The classiﬁcation presented here focuses on extractive activities, but
conﬂicts can emerge at other stages of the life cycle of a commodity.
In such a way, material extraction is connected to environmental and
social pressures at different localities and to social groups that exceed the
speciﬁc place where extraction is occurring. We point to four key stages
related to the life cycle of a (raw material) commodity where conﬂicts
emerge: extraction, transport, processing and ﬁnal disposal.
First, conﬂicts can arise at the site of extraction. We have previously
pointed out some of the socioenvironmental pressures and conﬂicts
directly related to extraction.
Second, the transport of raw materials to processing plants is also
related to noise, dust and air pollution. This stage also includes the
impacts and conﬂicts related to the construction of transport infras-
tructures, such as pipelines and ports. An example of the tensions
related to these activities is the Initiative for the Integration of the
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), led by a group of Latin
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American governments with the support of the Interamerican Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) and the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF).
The IIRSA initiative aims to improve the connection of Latin American
economies, connecting the Paciﬁc and Atlantic oceans to facilitate the
extraction and export of Latin American raw materials. It includes the
construction of hydroways, gas and oil pipelines, ports and so forth.
IIRSA-related projects are giving way to numerous large conﬂicts in
the region (Svampa, 2012; Gavaldà, 2013), as these infrastructures are
reaching the lands of distant communities that are also areas of high
biodiversity and landscape value.
Third, processing plants usually require energy, water and chemi-
cal substances, and can also affect the quality of soil, air, and surface
and underground waters, triggering health problems and social conﬂict.
A paradigmatic case is La Oroya in Peru. La Oroya is a mining town in
the Peruvian Andes that, since 1922, has been the site of a polymetallic
smelter. This has produced toxic emissions and wastes from the plant.
Recently the smelter was recycling scrap metals imported through El
Callao (Lima’s harbour) and taken up by railway to La Oroya, which
has suffered from critical levels of air pollution and is considered to be
one of the most polluted places on Earth (Blacksmith Institute, 2006).
Owned by the Missouri-based Doe Run Corporation, the smelter was
long signalled as responsible for the dangerously high lead levels found
in children’s blood.
Fourth, conﬂicts can arise when commodities reach the end of their
life cycle and are discarded. Waste generation also includes impacts on
soil, air and water generated during extraction, transport and processing
(e.g. mining waste ponds and landﬁlls). Climate change could be seen as
a waste-disposal conﬂict because we have exceeded the capacity of new
terrestrial vegetation and the oceans to absorb the carbon dioxide pro-
duced, and therefore its concentration in the atmosphere has increased
to 402 ppm.
New approaches to studying environmental conﬂicts:
A statistical political ecology
Since the 2000s, various groups have been creating online databases that
register information on ongoing socioenvironmental conﬂicts in Latin
America and beyond. These databases reﬂect an effort initiated by NGOs
and social movements to make visible the increasing environmental
injustices that communities confront. More recently, universities and
research projects have also engaged in such systematization initiatives.
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Some aim at mapping out environmental conﬂicts in one country, such
as a recent inventory of over 80 conﬂicts in Colombia (Pérez-Rincón,
2014) and the Brazilian Mapa da Injustiça Ambiental e Saúde (Envi-
ronmental Injustice and Health Map, by FIOCRUZ). In addition, there
is a growing number of databases recording socioenvironmental con-
ﬂicts throughout the region, including OLCA, and worldwide, such as
our EJOLT project (Martinez-Alier et al., 2011). There are also databases
focused on speciﬁc issues, such as tree plantations (see WRM), mining
(OCMAL) and land-grabbing (Genetic Resources Action International
(GRAIN)). Furthermore, there are important efforts being made to report
on processes of protest and “criminalization” of activists or human
rights violations in Latin America and the Caribbean (OCMAL, 2013;
Toledo, Garrido and Barrera Bassols, 2013). This “criminalization of
protest” refers to different processes that range from government ofﬁ-
cials and politicians who promote and apply laws that typify protest
as unacceptable social behaviour and label protest as sabotage, terror-
ism or an obstruction of public space; to protesting organizations as
illicit associations or publicly framing protestors as criminals (Saavedra,
2013); and, most dramatically, to the reality of countries such as Brazil,
Mexico, Colombia and Peru, where environmental activists are being
killed while defending livelihoods and nature (see the lists provided by
Global Witness). The ENGOV project has created an inventory of Latin
American databases and maps (available at www.engov.eu), while the
global inventory by EJOLT allows us to analyse and compare different
features of numerous extractive conﬂicts (available at www.ejatlas.org).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have explained the main trends in the social
metabolism of Latin America and have focused on one of the main
indicators, the material ﬂows. In the last 40 years the extraction of mate-
rials has increased four-fold, far more than the population. A substantial
part of the extracted materials (whether biomass, fossil fuels or metal
ores, although not the building materials) goes to exports. We have
developed a typology of conﬂicts according to the commodities in ques-
tion. Many grassroots environmental organizations, and also academics
and state bodies, are aware that there are more ecological distribution
conﬂicts, and they contribute to environmental governance by making
them visible through inventories and maps.
In regard to external trade and economic policies, we have insisted
that at present most South American economies have large physical
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trade deﬁcits (in tonnes), and simultaneously they have or are about to
have commercial trade deﬁcits (in monetary terms). That is to say, the
large physical exports that carry heavy ecological and social rucksacks
are scarcely able to pay for the imports. In all of South America there are
huge exports in volume (tonnes of oil, coal, iron ore, soyabeans, wood,
copper, etc.) and yet several countries (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela
and Ecuador) have monetary commercial deﬁcits. Remarkably, the
recent “extractivist” trend happens both in countries with national-
popular governments and in those with neoliberal governments. Even
President Mujica of Uruguay favoured an iron-mining project with the
Indian company Zamin Ferrous Metals in 2014. This project aims to
export 18 million tonnes per year during the next 20 years – about 6
tonnes per inhabitant – leaving behind large environmental liabilities.
There are structurally unfavourable terms of trade for Latin American
countries exporting natural resources. First, persistent physical trade
deﬁcits are recorded. We call it a “deﬁcit” because natural resources
are lost or depleted. In recent years, this trend has been accompanied
by a monetary trade deﬁcit that affects both small and large coun-
tries. Brazil had, between January and March of 2014, a trade deﬁcit
of US$6,072 million. This is the highest deﬁcit for a quarter in 21 years,
while Argentina has seen its monetary trade surplus sharply decrease
between 2012 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2014. Monetary trade deﬁcits must
be balanced by other income in the current account or in the capital
account balance. The inﬂow of foreign direct investment can offset the
trade deﬁcit but it will generate income that will later leave the country.
Increased indebtedness will lead to a need to export more and more,
causing further environmental damage and social conﬂict.
While the demand for raw materials that are not recycled (e.g. fos-
sil fuels) or only partly recycled (e.g. metals) is likely to remain over
time, even without economic growth in the world system, the social and
environmental costs of extraction are increasing as the grade of metallic
minerals and the EROI decreases. This is the case as oil or gas is extracted
from distant places, as also happens with timber, soy or palm oil. At the
same time, even if in the long term the demands remain, prices can fall
sharply due to variations in the business cycles. Overall, reprimarization
is a risky economic strategy. Therefore, it is not surprising that new Latin
American voices call for different economic policies. For them, the local
complaints against extractive industries (including biomass extraction)
should not be seen as instances of NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) or as
attacks on the state, but instead as useful contributions towards a change
in environmental governance.
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Therefore the criticism of South American post-extractivist scholars
(Maristella Svampa, Eduardo Gudynas, Alberto Acosta) not only has a
social and environmental basis but also has economic and democratic
foundations. The export of raw materials depletes natural resources and
causes pollution and conﬂicts with local populations. Governments use
repression as a method to facilitate raw-material extraction. On the
other hand, the prices of these major exports are cheap in comparison to
imports, hence a new march along the route to debt. These tendencies
point to the need for a change in policies. In fact, there have been some
attempts to curb the export of raw materials through public policies such
as the Yasuní-ITT initiative in Ecuador from 2007 to 2013, aimed at leav-
ing oil in the ground under zones with exceptionally high biodiversity
in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Popular resistance is also expressed in many
existing protests, often arguing in terms of indigenous land rights. And
new institutions arise as referenda or local consultations (see Chapter
11). These local protests and initiatives for environmental justice are a
response to the power of corporations and governments, a power that
leads to a deﬁcit in local democracy. In sum, next to physical and mon-
etary trade deﬁcits, the export of raw materials also produces a deﬁcit in
local democracy.
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Notes
1. A recent industry study signals that, “With declining ore grades exacerbated
by increasing energy and other costs, and signiﬁcant deposits being found at
greater depths or in more remote areas, the average capital costs for copper
production capacity in new mines increased an average of 15% per year over
the past 20 years, with much of the increase evident since 2008” (SNL Metals
Economics Group, 2013).
2. Mining-related chemical pollution can be generated by the release into the
environment of reagents added during mineral processing, such as the sul-
phuric acid that is used for the leaching of copper oxides, or the mercury or
cyanide used to process gold. Pollution is also caused by the oxidation that
naturally occurs in minerals that are present in the ore as a result of expo-
sure to air, water and/or bacteria. Many metal ores, such as nickel, copper and
lead, occur in the rock as sulphides. The contact with oxygen and water trig-
gers an oxidation process that forms sulphuric acid. This process can result in
the formation of acid rock drainages. This process has been pointed out as one
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of the main environmental challenges of the mining industry (Bridge, 2004;
Government of Australia, 2007; Giurco et al., 2010).
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